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* Fu yo P ro fes so r  of  Law and Director  of  the Centers  fo r  Japanese  and  Korean
Law Stud ies  and  the Program on  In terna t iona l  Human Rights  and Religious Liberties
a t  Colu mb ia U niv er sit y. Gr ad ua te d fr om H a r v a r d La w S cho ol a nd  me mb er  of th e
Harva rd Law Review; former law clerk t o Just ice Ben j a m in  K a pl a n  of t h e  Su p r em e
Judicia l Court  of Massa chus ett s an d J ust ice William H . Rehnqu ist of the United
Stat es Su pr em e Cou rt , a s we ll a s De pu ty  Leg al  Advis er , De pu ty  Un der  Se creta ry for
Economic  Affairs, and Ambassa dor for Tra de and E nvironmen tal Affairs in t he Un ited
Stat es Depart ment  of Stat e. This Article is derived from a lecture given  a t  t he
Reli giou s Liberties Sym posium h eld on Oct ober  6-7, 19 97, a t B ri gh am  Youn g
Unive r s ity in P rovo, Uta h. I wou ld like t o tha nk  W. Cole Dur ha m for t he oppor tu nit y
to pa r t ic ipa t e  in  this  con fer en ce.  I w ou ld  a ls o like  to t hank t he m em be rs of  the B YU
Law Review, espe cially Je rem iah  J. Mor gan  an d David L . Morte nse n, for th eir
inva lua ble as sis ta nce  in r edu cing  th is le ctu re  to w ri tt en  form .
1. In  th e con te xt of cou nt ry -to-cou nt ry  int er act ion,  I wil l focus  mor e on  th e
ac tions o f t he  Un it ed S ta te s t ha n a ny  oth er  coun tr y. N ot on ly is  th is t he  exp er ien ce
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Ext er na l Monit or in g of Domes t ic Re ligiou s
Liberties
Michael  Young*
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 I  h ave been  as ked  to a ddr ess s ome of th e possible  extern a l
pres sur es th at  migh t b e exer te d on a  count ry to exp and  the
liberties  it a fford s it s in ha bita nt s, esp ecially in t he a rea  of reli-
giou s belief a nd  pr act ice. In t his  conte xt ,  I  int end  to exa min e
the na tu re of t he  ex terna l mon i tor ing mechan isms  for  human
r igh t s gene ra lly, and th en how those mechanisms are develop-
ing in th e cont ext of religious libert ies.  In  th is  context , it  is , of
course, e ssent ia l to examin e th e degree to which ,  and  the mech-
an isms thr ough which individual count ries or groups of coun-
t r ie s mon i tor  t he  behavior  of an other  coun t ry  and  then ,  if un-
sat isfied with  tha t  behavior , exe r t  pre ssu re on  tha t  coun t ry to
modify i ts  beh avior. I t is  als o import an t, h owever, t o exam ine
exte rna l monit or in g by  non-gove r n m en ta l or ga n iza t ion s
(NG Os ), i nt e rnat ional organizat ions (IOs) such as t he Un ited
Nations, an d r egiona l orga niza tion s. F ina lly, t o comple te the
pictu re , it is import an t t o under sta nd t he r elationsh ip between
the act ion s of NGOs  and IO’s  and the  va r ious  na t ion -s t a t es tha t
make up t he in ter na t ion a l sys tem . I w ill  br iefl y examin e each  of
these  is sues  in  tu rn .1
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ Y O U -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
502 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
with  wh ich  I am most  fa m i li a r  and in wh ich I have myself participated over th e
years,  but , as h as b een  tr ue of oth er a rea s of inte rn at iona l hu ma n r ight s, I  str ongly
su sp ect  th e U nit ed S ta te s’ per spe ctiv e wil l, t o som e ex te nt , dr ive t he  int er na tion al
mon ito r ing of religious liberties. Simp ly put, wha t t h e Un ite d St at es d oes,  for good
or  ill, has a  great effect on the wa y in  wh ich  these  i s sues  deve lop in  the  wor ld  a rena .
When  ther e is some question of external monitoring in t he ar eas of tr ad e, la bor
rights, envir onm ent al r ight s, an d, I  belie ve, t o a ve ry  lar ge e xte nt  in t he  ar ea  of
human  righ ts, t he U nit ed Sta tes h as la rgely dr iven t he a genda  an d th e action  plan .
The d rama t ic  upsu rge  in  in t ere s t  in  in t e r n a t ional religious liberties in t he Un ited
Stat es ma kes it  high ly likely th at  th is will be th e case in  th is ar ea a s well.
2. S ee Gre gory H . Fox, Mu lti na tion al E lecti on M oni tor ing: Advancing
International Law on th e High Wire, 18 FORD HAM  IN T’L L.J . 165 8, 1 659  (199 5).
3. S ee, e.g., J ohn  Quigle y, Perestroika African S tyle: One-Party Governm ent and
Hum an Right s in Ta nzan ia, 13 MIC H . J . IN T’L L. 611, 650-51 (1992) (discussin g th e
concern  tha t th ird world count ries have a bout inter ference in  the ir  i n t erna l  a ff ai r s
by western  countries th at consider t h e ir  involvement a legitimate role to ensure
de mo cra cy).
4. S ee Gre gory H . Fox, Th e Right  to Political Participation in International
Law, 17 YALE J . IN T’L L. 539, 590-91 (1992); Rand all G ree n, Hum an Rights and Most-
Fav ored -N ati on  Ta riff  Ra tes f or Pr odu cts f rom  th e People’s Repub li c o f Ch ina,  17 U.
P U G E T SOUND L. RE V. 611, 611-12 (1994 ); Quigley, supra  note 3, at  650.
5. S ee Demetrios James Ma ra nt is, Hum an Rights, Democracy, and
Development: T he E ur opea n C om m un ity  Mod el, 7 HARV. H U M . RTS . J. 1, 27 n.123
(199 4).
II. E X T E R N A L  MO N I TO R IN G  O F  H U M A N  RI G H T S  GE N E R A L L Y
 Of course, on e ca nnot  eve n  begin  t o di scu ss t his  i ssue
without  acknowle dgin g t ha t  se r iou s q ues t ion s e xis t  abou t  the
leg it im acy of monitoring the interna l affairs of other countries.2
This  monitoring has been debated extensively in  the a rea  of
human rights.3 I t  is always im porta nt  to consider  th e extent  to
which  one cou nt ry, a  gr oup of cou nt r i es , or  an  in terna t iona l
orga n iza t ion  ha s t he r ight  to look  a t  the intern al affairs of
an other  count ry. Ce rt ain ly, i n  t h e ear ly developm ent  of public
in terna t iona l laws ,  wh ich  began  to t ake the ir  cu r ren t form in
the 1800’s, it  wa s gen er a lly  conside red  illegi t im ate t o look  a t
the int e rna l a ffa i rs  of anothe r  coun t ry.  How a govern men t d ealt
with  its own citizens wa s consider ed to be th e exclusive concern
of tha t  governmen t .4
Over t ime,  two pr incipa l challenges a rose to the il leg it im acy
of exte rna l monit or ing  of t he  t rea tmen t  a  coun t ry a ffords  it s
inh abit an ts . The fir st  cha llenge a rose in  t e rms of defining what
was a  mat te r  of in terna l  concern .5 In crea sin gly, ma tt er s  t h at
were  init ially t hou ght  t o be  en t ir ely  the p rovin ce of t he loca l
govern men t  were considered fair  game for criticism by other
coun t r ie s because t hose ma tt ers h ad some im p a ct  or  effect  on
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6. Con fer en ce on Secu rit y an d Co-opera tion  in E ur ope: Fin al Act, Aug. 1, 1975,
14 I.L.M. 12 92 [h er ein aft er  He lsin ki Accor ds]; see also Richa rd C . Visek, Creatin g th e
Eth nic El ector at e Throu gh Legal Restorationism : Citizenship R ights in E stonia , 38
H ARV. IN T’L L.J . 315, 326 n.60 (199 7).
7. S ee Lucien  J . Dhooge, N o Pla ce for M elros e: Channe lsurfing, Hum an Righ ts,
and the European Union’s “Television Without Fron tiers” Directive, 16 N.Y.L. SCH . J .
IN T’L & CO M P . L. 279, 311 (1996); Lois E. Fie lding,  Taking a Closer Look at Threats
to Peace: The Power of the Security Co u n cil to A dd ress  Hu m an ita ria n C ris es,  73 U.
DE T. MER CY L. RE V. 551, 553 (1996 ); Bozhena Ol sha niws ky, 20th  Ann iver sary  of  t he
Ukrainian  He ls ink i  Group, UKR . WKLY., Jan . 5, 1997, a t 7, available in  1997 WL
1175677.
8. S ee Timoth y William Wa ter s & Rach el Guglielm o, Com me nt ,  “Two Souls to
St ruggle with . . . .”: The Failing Im plementat ion of Hun gary’s New Minorities Law
and Dis crim in at ion  Aga in st  Gyp sies , 9 HARV. H U M . RTS . J . 297 , 31 2 (19 96).
9. S ee Wins ton  P .  Nagan , In t erna tiona l  Cr imina l Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal
for Former Yu goslavia, 6 DU K E  J . CO M P . & IN T’L  L. 127, 157 (1995); Michael L.
other coun tr ies. Actions in th e tr ade a rena  prov ide perhaps  the
simplest exam ple. Wit h t he dra ma tic increase in  tr eat y based
promise s to pr ovid e a cces s t o dom es t ic m arket s,  any a ct ion s
ta ken  th at  might  imped e th at  access became legitima te t ar gets
of examin at ion and  criticism. Domestic taxes, en vironmenta l
regulations, investm ent  appr oval systems , and  mu ch more,
became appropriate subjects of bila te ra l and  mult i la te ra l
discussions, criticism, and even sanctions.
The secon d  a nd m uch more p oin ted  cha lle nge t o the
t rad it iona l view involves the proliferation of agreements t o
adhere to un i form in terna t iona l st an da rd s in  the  a rea  of human
rights. This  pr ocess st ar ted  in t he m id-1960s a nd  found it s
br ea k-t hr ough  expr ession  in t he m id-1970s w ith  th e He lsin ki
Accords .6 In  the H els in ki  Accord s,  mem ber  coun t r ies  of th e
Con fer en ce of Securit y Coopera tion  in  Eu rope (CSCE) agreed  to
adhere to ce r ta in  human  r ight s standa rds.7 The  imp licit su bt ext
of the H els in ki  Accord s w as t ha t  if t h e signat ory coun tr ies
failed to live up to those s t a n d a rds, that failure was a
legitim at e ma tt er of mu ltila ter al d iscus sion i n t he con text  of
the CSCE . Thu s, one  count ry cou ld legitimat ely raise a nd
discuss  the p urely  in ter na l be havior  of another  count ry in  a
pu blic in terna t iona l  se t t ing8 and  tha t  d iscuss ion  was consider ed
legitimat e an d app ropria te.
Cer ta in count ries still  strongly res ist  th is m ar ked  tr end  in
in terna t iona l law . Ch in a , for  exa mple, i s a  st rong a nd voca l
opponen t of any ext ern al d iscus sion of its h u m a n  r ight s or civil
liberties.9 I t  cl a ims  tha t  “domestic m at ter s” are  never  a legit i
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Bur ton , Note , Legalizing the S ublegal: A Proposal for Codifying a Doctr in e of
Unilateral Hu m an ita ria n I nt erven tion , 85 GE O . L.J . 417 , 43 7-38  (199 6).
10. S ee, e.g., Pr iya Alagir i, Comm ent , Give Us S overeignty or Give Us Debt:
Debt or Countries’ Perspective on Debt-for-Natu re Swaps , 41 AM . U. L. RE V. 485, 497
n.74 (1992) (discussing th e hum a n  r i gh t s deb at es a t t he  Un ite d N at ions  wh ich t ook
pla ce in t he 1 950s). 
11. G.A. Res. 220 0, U.N . GAOR, 24t h Se ss., Su pp. N o. 16, at  55, U.N . Doc.
A/6316 (196 6).
12. Cf. Ha ri M. Os ofsky, Not e, Domesticating International Criminal L aw:
Br ing ing Hu m an  Ri gh ts V iola tor s to Ju stice, 107 YALE L.J . 191, 209 (1997)
(expla in ing th at  Un ited S ta tes cour ts h ave r ecent ly a llowed numerous suits against
human  ri gh ts  viol at or s for  cus tom ar y in te rn at ion al  la w vi ola ti on s).
13. S ee, e.g., Kar l J . Irvin g, The Un ited Nations a n d  Dem ocrat ic In terv ent ion :
Is “S words  into B allot Boxes” En ough?, 25 DE N V. J . IN T’L L. & P OL’Y 41, 48-49 (1996)
(di scuss ing o rgan iza t ions  tha t  a r e conce rn ed w ith  dem ocra tic a nd  hu ma n r igh ts  effort s
in  oth er  cou nt ri es ).
mate topic of bilate ra l or m ult ila teral discussion. For most
coun t r ies, however, the H elsinki Accords rep resen ts a
watershed,  ma king r esistan ce to discu ssion s of domest ic
beh avior in  int ern at iona l fora ver y difficult .10
Numerous addit ional agreem ent s followed—and , of cour se,
p receded—the He ls ink i Accords. The Coven an t on  Civil an d
Polit ica l Rights, 11 among  a  range of other  agreements , was
negotiat ed before, bu t s igne d a nd  ra tified  aft er , th e Hels inki
Accords . Al l a r e  impor t an t  and re in force  the not ion  tha t  the
pu rely  int e rna l act ions  of a  coun t ry a re a n a ppr opriat e subject
of i nt e rna tion a l int er est  an d a tt en tion . Equ ally im port an tly,
with  the a ccumula t ion  of thes e k in ds  of in ter na t ion a l
agreements, sim ilar  pr inciples  of cus tom ar y int ern at ion a l law
began t o emerge.12 I n  c on t r a s t  t o b i l a t e r a l  ex t er n a l
moni tor ing, exte rna l moni tor ing by an  in terna t iona l or  regiona l
orga n iza t ion  de pe nds  hea vily on  th e specific agre eme nt s in to
which  th e coun tr ies ha ve enter ed. Those  count rie s t ha t h ave
ent ered  into agreemen t s,  ar e  member s of the  United  Nat ions ,
or  are members of regional organizations wit h  som e  sor t  of
agreem ent re la t ing to civi l and  pol it i ca l  r igh t s—such  as  the
Coun cil of Europe  or  the Orga niza t ion  of Amer ica n  St a t e s—are
also then su bject to the agreements r elated to those
in terna t iona l organizations, as well as region a l or ga n iza t ion s.
Those organ iza t ions  a re cons idered l eg it imate  fora  for
d iscuss ing th e mem ber  count ries ’ domes tic tr eatm ent of its own
citizens.13
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14. S ee Kenneth  W. Abbot t , “Econ om ic” Iss ues  an d P olit ical P art icipa tion : Th e
Evolv ing Bound aries of International Federalism , 18 CARDO ZO L. RE V. 971, 1007-09
(1996) (discussing  th e be ne fits  der ived  from  NG Os t ha t m onit or a nd  re por t on
domes tic beh av ior ).
15. S ee id .
16. S ee Wat ers  & Guglie lmo, supra  note 8, at  312.
17. S ee supra  n ote  11; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights , G. A.
Fin ally,  it is  imp or t a n t  to unders tand , a t  l eas t  in  the
in terna t iona l con text  of human right s, it is critical to rem ember
the role of NGOs. Th ese or gan izat ions gen era lly have no formal
role i n the  mon i tor ing  process , bu t  t hey d o gat her  inform at ion
and da ta , make  tha t  in form a t ion  publ ic,  and often  pu t
consider able  press ur e on various governm ent s eith er t o a l ter
th eir  beh avior or  to pr essu re ot her  count rie s  t o alt er t heir
behavior .14 The se or gan izat ions t ry t o brin g to light  th e wa ys in
which  a  count ry is  a llow in g or  disa llow in g civi l r igh t s or  civil
liberties  with in  it s  own ter r i tor ia l borders  and  then  u rge the
in terna t iona l community  to t ake s t eps  to force  a  coun t ry to
a lt er  it s inapp ropr ia te beh avior .15
In  light  of all th is, it is  incr eas ingly difficult  for  a  coun t ry to
make a  pe rsu asive ca se  in  the in ter na t ion a l  ar e n a  t ha t  i t  is  no
longer legitimat e to look at  how it tr ea t s its own citizens.
Sim ply put, domestic treat ment of citizens has becom e a
legitim at e su bject of inte rn at iona l dis course,  and,  wi thou t
dou bt , is  lik ely  to rem ain  so. 16
III. E X T E R N A L  MO N I TO R IN G  O F  RE L I G I O U S  LI BE R T IE S
 Tu rn ing m ore s pecifically t o ext er na l m onit or in g of reli giou s
liberties, a  va r ie ty of quest ions a ris e, some gen era l to t he  en t ir e
human r igh t s deba te and  othe r s ra th er specific to th e na tu re of
the libert y un der  discu ssion . Most im port an t, of cour se, is t he
que st ion of precisely what  religious libert ies ar e to be
monitored  and  wha t  s t andards a re t o be use d? As th is
sympos ium amply  demons t r a t es , desp it e a ll t he good  will in t he
world, ther e is still rem ar ka bly litt le agreem ent  in th is ar ea.
This, of course , con side rably  exa cer ba tes  the p roble ms,  or  a t
least th e ten sions, th at  ar e likely to arise a s one coun tr y, in
some int e rna tiona l con text ,  ques t ions  how anothe r  coun t ry
deals with r eligious liberties.
In terna t iona l human  r ights d ocum ent s such a s The
Covenant  on Civil a nd  Polit ical Righ ts 17 ser ve as usefu l  st a r t ing
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Res. 217 (A), U .N . GAO R, 3 d S es s.,  U. N.  Doc. A/8 10 (1 948 ).
poin ts to agreem ent , but t hey ar e on l y s t a rt ing poin t s.  Care fu l
examina t ion  of the language and mean ing of these docu m en t s
reve als  th em t o be both  over- an d u nd er-in clusive. Mon itor ing
reli giou s libert ies pr esen ts  pa rt icular ly difficult  issu es because
reli giou s liber tie s u nd er lie cult ur e, na tion -build ing, h ist ory, a nd
a  whole ran ge of th ings even m or e fundamenta l  than  other
bas ic civil and hu man  rights discussed in  the in terna t iona l
a rena . Thu s, developing some sort  of a consensu s on  moni tor ing
religious libert ies presen ts a  consider able challenge.
At  lea st  pa r t  of th e p roblem is  the a bs en ce of a ny
syst ema tic, effect ive  and u n ive rsa lly  leg it im ate m et hod for
developin g a  consensus a mong countries. Th is  lack  of consensus
increases the p oss ibi lit y of power  pol it ics , in clu ding t he u se  of
power fu l economic and  geopolitical positions t o define th e
debat es th at  ar e oth er wise u nd efina ble. F or exa mple, t o the
extent  coun t r ies a re u nwilling t o en ga ge in  th is  de ba te or  wor k
in  good fait h t o esta blish  mech an ism s t o decide issu es of th is
sor t , som e cou nt r ies —the U nit ed  St a tes , for  exam ple—will ta ke
mat t e r s into their own han ds and begin to pressure  coun t r ie s t o
adhere to a  st an da rd  th at  is n ot  neces sa rily u niver sa lly
recognized, but  th at  is imposed by th e most powerful. The
difficulty of reach ing consensus  may make some count r ies  more
impa t ien t . Th e U nit ed  St a tes , cer t a in ly bein g for em ost  among
t he coun t r ies  wit h  lit t le p a t ien ce, m ay be gin  to de fin e  t he
debat e in ways n ot sat isfactory to all coun tr ies.
The area of religious liberties is thus likely t o be one in
which  th ere m ay be app reciably more acrim ony between
governments.  It  is a lso likely t ha t in  t his area, a few countries,
like t h e United  S ta tes  and  some of the  Nord ic and  European
count ries, will dr ive th e  issue . This  pressure  may make
exte rna l mon itor ing a  pa rt icular ly volatile p olitical is sue and
perhaps in som e ways  eve n  counter -pr odu ct ive . P res su re fr om
some coun tr ies on  other  coun t r i es  has th e pote nt ial for a ctu ally
dela ying t he d ialogue  ra th er t ha n a dva ncin g it.
Never theless, some s ubs ta nt ial p res su re t o enga ge in
ser ious ext ern al m onit orin g of in terna l affairs is a fact. Good or
bad, that  is a rea lity  t oday and  we  have  to th ink  abou t  how to
proceed in th e face of an en vir onment in which that  kind of
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18. S ee Abbott, supra  not e 14, a t 100 8; Tha lif Deen, United N ations: U.N. Lau ds
NGOs  for  Hum a n itarian Work , IN T E R P R E S S  SERVICE , Sept. 14, 1997 (“NGOs, he said,
ha ve made  a  pa r t icular ly va lu ab le con tr ibu ti on i n t he  socia l, econ omi c an d
humani ta r ian fields — by providin g in dep en den t m onit orin g, ga th er ing  infor ma tion ,
se rving as  al te rn at ive  cha nn els  of co m m u n ications and as providers of services and
implemen tor s of pr ogr am s.”).
19. S ee Fox, supra  not e 4, at  540-41; Fa rh an  Ha q, El S alvador-Labor: New  Deal
For  Maquila Workers, IN T E R P R E S S  SERVICE , Nov. 3, 1997.
20. S ee Abbot t,  supra  note 14, at  1007-08.
21. S ee Ha q, supra  not e 19 ; U.N . Ev en t  S h o w s Power of Activist Organizations,
P O R T LA N D OREG ONI AN , Sept. 14, 1997, at A5.
22. S ee Abbot t ,  supra  not e 14 , at  1008  (discu ssi ng  th eir  effect iven ess  on
repor t ing to  in t er n a t ional or gan ization s on dom estic beh avior, es pecially in
envi ronmen t an d h um an  rig ht s); see also Deen , supra  note 18  (discuss ing how “NGOs
ha ve be com e ‘indi spe nsabl e p ar tner s’ of t he U nit ed  Nat ions” and other  orga niz at ions
to en su re  com pli an ce b y dom es ti c act or s).
m on itor ing is cert ain  to occur . The a bsen ce of an y kin d of
agreement  ove r  wh a t  is to be monitored or at  least the
development  of some basic stan dar ds of religious liberties to
which  all coun tr ies can be expected t o adher e ar e poten t ial
d a n ge r s in t his a rea . Unless we a re a ble to work together  to
de velop those minimum sta ndar ds,  t h e absence of standa rds
and the  presence  of exte rna l m onit orin g crea tes  a ver y difficult
and vola t ile  in ter na t ion a l s it ua t ion .
IV. ME C H A N I S M S  F O R  E X T E R N A L  MO N I TO R IN G
 There is cer ta inly s om e  m on i t or i n g i n  t h e i nt e r na t iona l
human righ ts a ren a wit h wh ich people a re q uit e fam iliar .
Ex terna l monitorin g, wheth er it be  of th e  env ironment , human
rights, or religious libert ies, can be done by NGOs,18
i n te rna t iona l and regional organizations,19 an d bilater ally by
othe r  coun t r ie s.
A. External Monitoring by NGOs
 NGOs do a gr eat  dea l of m on i tor ing,  using the informa t ion
t hey derive to pressure targeted count ries.20 They do th is
th rough pu blicity a nd  lobbyin g  their own governments t o put
p res su re on targeted countries.21 NGOs also oper a t e with in
in terna t iona l and r egiona l organ iza t ions  to pu t  pre ssu re on
different countries.22
NGO moni tor ing, t hough  often  disfa vor ed  by t he t a rget s of
the mon itor ing, in  fact h as  a n um ber  of consid era ble
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23. S ee Abbott, supra  note 14, at  1007-08.
24. Cf. Richa rd  Dicke r , Sout h Korea Labor Right s Violations Und er Democratic
Ru le, 14 UCLA P AC . BA S IN  L.J . 196 (1996) (explaining the l imited purpose  of a
specific NG O).  But  cf. Mak au  wa Mu tu a, The Ideology of Hum an Rights, 36 VA. J .
IN T’L L. 589, 610 n.7 3 (1996) (describing t he wor k of an N GO called H um an  Right s
Watch  a s  cove r ing  the themes o f a rms  t r an sfer s, ch ildr en ’s r igh ts , fre e ex pr ess ion,
pr ison  con dit ion s, a nd  wom en ’s rig ht s).
25. S ee, e.g., Bob William s, Forei gn  Pet roleu m  Com pa ni es Dev elopi ng  N ew
Parad igm  for Op erat in g in  Ra in  Fores t R egion , OIL & GA S  J ., Apr. 21, 1997, at 37.
26. S ee, e.g., Anil Noel N ett o, Ma lay sia : Activ ist s Pr otest  Gover nm ent  Cra ckd own
on NGOs , IN T E R P R E S S  SERVICE , Ja n. 1, 1997 (n oting t ha t Ma laysia n N GOs h ave
focused on  “ma jor  hu ma n r igh ts  ab us es  wh er eve r t he y occu r”).
27. S ee Cou nt ry R eports on Hum an Righ ts Practices for 1996: Hearing Before
the Com m . on  In t’l Rel at ion s, H ous e of R epres ent at ives , 105th Cong. 46, 46-51 (1997)
( st a t ement  of El isa  C. M as sim in o, a cti ng  Dir ect or , Wa sh in gt on  Offi ce ,  La wyers’
Commit t ee for  Human Rights );  Mutua ,  supra  note  24, at  621; A. Dan Ta rlock,  T he
Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Developmen t of International
E n vironmental Law , 68 CH I .-KE N T L. RE V. 61, 72-73 (1992); Comm ent , Development s
in  the Law–International Environmental Law , 104 HARV. L. RE V. 1484, 1532 (1991).
adva nta ges.23 Countr ies may be un comfortable with  NGO
monit or ing because th ey may perceive that  NGOs are
concern ed with a  relat ively nar row ra nge of issues.24 For
examp le, an  NGO may focus exclus ively on h um an  righ ts
without  adequate empha sis on  economic deve lopmen t  or
pol it ica l sta bility. Neverth eless, across that r ange of issues,
NGO mon itor ing h as  tw o sub st an tia l ad van ta ges . F irs t, wit hin
th eir  area of interest,  most NGOs do tend to pick the most
impor tan t  issu es t o monit or. (This, by the wa y, tends  to be
slight ly more t ru e of th e hu ma n r ights N GOs th an  some other
orga niza t ion s; some en vironmen ta l organizat ions, for exam ple,
have a  h i story of targeting issues tha t ma y be somewhat less
cen t ra l to t rue  env ironmenta l pr otection  and  may be somewhat
more importa nt for fund-raising purposes.25 Howeve r, in  the
human rights a r e a , th e NGOs h ave ten ded to focus on a rea s
th at  ar e cent ra l.26)
Second, NGOs t end t o be rat her  objective or a t leas t r at her
non-d iscr imina tory in their criticisms.27 They point t he finger  a t
th eir  hom e  cou n t ry just a s quickly as t hey point it  at  other
cou n t r ies. The y exam ine  police bru ta lity in  New  York Cit y to
the sa me  ext e n t  as p olice  br uta lit y in  In dia . Th is  app roach
presen t s cons iderab le  advan tages over bila ter al m onit orin g
between  count r ies  because  cou n t r ies h ave a  disconcer tin g
tendency not  to crit icize th emselves  or  to exa min e is su es  on
which  the ir  r ecord  is  not  ve ry st ron g. Thu s, bila ter al m onit orin g
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28. S ee, e.g., Dan iel P. Br adlow, Hong Kong: Preserv ing  Human R ights and  the
Role of Law , 12 AM . U. J . IN T’L L. & P OL’Y 361, 442 (1997) (describin g rest rictions in
Ch ina  th at  ar e p ro ba ble  in  Ho ng  Kon g).
29. Cf. Fox, supra  no te  2, a t 1 658 -59 (discuss ing  membersh ip  in  reg iona l
or ga ni za ti on s); Gre gory H . Fox, Self-Determin a t io n  in  th e Post -Cold  Wa r E ra: A  N ew
Internal Focus?, 16 MICH . J . IN T’L L. 733, 769 (199 5) (d escribing monitor ing by
reg iona l organ ization s) (reviewing YVES  BE I G BE D E R, INTE RNAT I ONAL MONITORING OF
P LE B I S C I T E S, REFERE NDA AND NATIONAL E L E C T IO N S: SELF -DE T E R M I N AT I O N  AN D
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (199 4)).
30. S ee Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Sla u g h t er ,  Tow ard  a T heor y of
Effective S up ran ati ona l Ad jud icat ion , 107 YALE L.J . 273 , 27 6 (19 97).
31. S ee, e.g., Pa ul E . Sigmu nd, R eligi ous  Hu m an  R igh ts  in  La tin  Am erica , 10
often  res u lt s in  som ewhat  se lect ive  cr it icis m of pr oblems and
select ive det e rmina t ion  of priorities. NGOs, on the other ha nd,
gener ally moni tor  in  a  somewhat  more  neu t ra l  fash ion  and  t end
to pick  the m ore im por tan t  is su es  fir st . Bot h  of these aspects of
exte rn al m onit orin g ar e sign ificant  an d h ighly u seful.
S ince some d egre e of exter na l monit orin g is  now a  fact  of
life  for virt ua lly all  coun t r ies , t a rget ed  coun t r ies  a re be t t er  off
encourag ing an d facilita ting t he m ost neu tr al, even-han ded
moni tor ing possible, and, in at least some cases, t h a t  may we ll
be performed by NG Os an d, for some of the sam e reasons,
perhaps  some in tern at iona l or ga n iza t ion s a s w ell . Th is  type of
moni tor ing ma y  well be p re fera ble polit ically a nd  pr act ically t o
bila te ra l mon itor ing.
Desp ite  the a dvantages  of gr an t in g some a ccess to NGOs,
however, ma ny countr ies ta ke ju s t  t h e oppos it e  t ack , t rying to
inh ibit  and rest rict NGOs.28 F rom a  medium- to long-t e rm
pers pective, this m ay ult imat ely be a serious political mist ak e.
The sa me is  alm ost cer ta inly t ru e of mult ilat era l and
regiona l organ iza t ions . The Un it ed Na t ions ’ Human  Righ t s
Com mission  has a  de se rved  rep uta t ion  for  bot h  objectivit y an d
consider able  in terna t ion al legitima cy. It is t her efore wise t o
encourage coun t r ie s t o permi t t he  UN Human  Righ t s
Commission t o monitor religious liberties.
B. Ext ern al  Monit oring by  R egion al  Organiz at ion s
 Region a l or ga n iza t ion s ca n  a lso mon i tor  a  coun t ry’s in terna l
affairs. A number  of regiona l  organiza t ions  have  an
inst i t ut ionalize d hum an rights component to their activities,29
s u ch  as  the European  Cour t  of Human Righ ts30 and t he
Or gan izat ion of Amer ican  S ta tes ’ Human Right s Com mission .31
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E MORY IN T’L L. RE V. 173, 177 (1996 ); Chris toph er R . Thom as, Th e OAS  at a  Ti m e of
Chan ge in the Americas, IN T’L DE F . RE V., Dec. 31, 1994, at 66.
32. S ee Thom as, supra  note 31, at  66.
33. Cf. Anthony D’Amato , Th e Concep t of  Hum an Rights in In ternational Law,
82 CO L U M. L. RE V. 1110, 1119 (1982) (st at ing  th at  th er e a re  a n um ber  of re gion al
tr ibun als  la cki ng  en for cem en t p owe rs ).
34. S ee, e.g., Bert a E sper an za H ern án dez Tr uyol, Out in  Left Field: Cuba’s Post-
Cold War S t r i keou t, 18 FORD HAM  IN T’L L.J . 15, 17-18 (1994) (discussing the Un ited
States’ pr act ice w it h r es pe ct t o Cu ba ).
35. S ee Wippm an , supra  note 28, at  670-71.
36. S ee, e.g., Vladim ir La vrish chev & Yevgen i Spir idonov, Ru ssian S teel Will
Keep  Being Partly Ba rred From Western E urope Until th e Year 2001, BIZE K O N  N E W S ,
April  11, 1997, available in  1997 WL 7801814 (discussing the European Un ions’
in t erac tions wit h R us sia ).
These ar e high ly useful monitorin g organizat ions. Moreover,
s in ce t h ey ar e r egiona lly orien te d a nd  th us , by som e light s a t
least, have a  gr ea ter  de gr ee  of cult u ra l a nd h is tor ica l
sen sit ivity,  man y countries consider  th em a  pa rt icular ly
appropriate fora for examining human  rights issues.
Thus, in t heor y at  leas t, r egional organ izations could be
effective in de veloping r eligious  libert y st an da rd s a nd  ap plying
those standa rds  with  a  cu l tu ra l and  h is tor i ca l  s ens it i vi ty tha t  is
most us eful.32 From this perspective, perha ps regiona l
orga n iza t ion s ought  to be de veloped a nd  encour aged  most  of all.
The pr oblem wit h  regiona l or ga n iza t ion s,  however , is th at  in
many cases th e y h a ve a limited jurisdictional mandate an d,
more imp or t ant ly, a limited geograph ical coverage.33 Major
re gions of the wor ld  have n o su ch  orga n iza t ion s.  Asia , for
examp le, con ta ins  a  la rge  pe rcent age of the wor ld’s p opu la t ion
but ha s n o region al or gan i zations capable of addressing these
kin ds of iss ue s in  even  a m ar gina lly effective wa y.
C. Bilateral External Monitoring
 Bilat era l monitorin g, somet imes r eferred  t o a s u n il a te r al
moni tor ing, is becomin g incre as ingly im port an t in  t h e world
today and,  not  su rpr is in gly,  wh er e m ost  of t he r eal t rou ble
occurs.  The  Un ite d St at es h as  been  per ha ps m ost a ggressive of
a l l count r ies  of th e world  in s cru tin izing h um an  right s pra ctices
abroad,34 b u t  othe r  coun t r ie s or  groups  of coun t r ie s a r e
incr eas ingly visible in t his a ren a. 35 The European  Union  com es
imm ediat ely to mind a s a good example.36
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37. S ee Michae l D. Greenbe rg, N ote, Creating an International Crimin al Court,
10 B.U. IN T’L L.J . 119 , 13 6 (19 92).
38. S ee Keith Stolte,  OFAC: Hands off  Intellectual Property Rights, 4 J.  INTELL .
P ROP . L. 25,  27 (1 996 ).
39. Cf. Micha el S. Men sik, Internat ional Considerations in  L icens ing, 496
PL I/P AT 689, 697 (1998) (describing the Un ited Sta te’s complete em bargoes of Cuba
and Nor th  Korea) .
40. Ex ec.  Or de r N o. 12 ,16 7, 4 4 F ed . Re g. 6 1,1 67 (1 979 ).
41. S ee 19 U .S. C. § 2 432  (199 4).
42. S ee Pet er B . Maggs , In ter na tion al T rad e an d C om m erce, 42 EM OR Y L.J . 449,
461 (1993) (“MFN [most favored nat ion] treatm ent for the S ov ie t  Union became linked
with  th at  of J ew ish  em igr at ion  from t he  Sov iet  Un ion .”).
43. S ee S. Ch en & W . Hu an g, Wei Jingsheng and  China’s Next ‘Long March ,’
CH R ISTI AN  SCI . MONITOR , Dec.  23, 1997, at 19 (noting tha t ma ny people in Amer ica
suppor t linking China’s most favored na tion stat us to its willingness t o  di scuss  human
Of course , bi la ter a l m onit or ing is  not a lways un dert ak en
with  en tirely pu re m otives. Som etim es it  is u sed for p ur ely
pol it ica l purpose s , s u ch as t he large-scale embargos of Iraq
which  are sponsored by the United Nations.37 Sometim es
bilater al  mon i tor ing  has  been  more  na r rowly t ar get ed  for  a
par ticular  pur pose, such  as t he emba rgo of Rh ode sia  and S outh
Afr ica .38 Addition ally, it  may be bila ter a l for  pu rely  pol it ica l
reasons such as the United S ta tes ’ embargoes  of Cuba  and
Nor th  Korea .39
Bilater al  monit or in g m ay occu r  in  a  va r ie ty of ways . For
examp le, one cou n tr y ma y comp lete ly ter min at e its  economic
relationships with  a n ot her  coun t ry , though  th is  genera l ly
re qu ir e s su bs tan t ia l polit ica l d isagr eemen ts in  add it ion  to
human r igh t s  viola t ions . Such  severe  sanct ion s ar e ra rely used
solely for t ar geted pr oblems like hum an  r ights , environmen t,
and  labor .
At  the sam e tim e, if th e politica l climat e is r ight , virt ua lly
a l l economic re la t ions  may appear  to be p red ica ted on  beh a v ior
in  the a rea  of human r igh t s.  For  exa mple, u nde r  the s o-called
J acks on-Vanik  Amendmen t ,40 th e Unit ed Sta tes pr edicated
nor m a l tra de relations with non-market economies on those
count ries’ em igra tion  policy.41 This wa s initia lly designed
lar gely to en courage R uss ia  to a llow  J ewish  em igr a t ion  to
Isr ael. 42 Over time it was ex pa n ded, however, to allow a broad-
scale  hum an rights investigation before “most favored nat ion ”
tra de st at us  was  gra nt ed. In  th e case  of China , for exa mp le, it
has resu l ted in  a  much  broader  annua l  deba te abou t  Chinese
human r igh t s  behavior .43 As  the case of Ch ina  makes  cl ea r ,
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r igh t s cond iti ons ); see generally Nan cy B. Zucker, Ch in a: Mos t-Fa vored -N ati on
Trea tmen t and U.S . Policy on the Chinas , 87 AM . SOC ’Y IN T’L L. P ROC . 432 (1993). But
see  Tru yol, supra  no te  34,  at  37,  43 (s ta ti ng  th at  gr an ti ng  Ch in a “m ost  fav ore d
na t ion” st at us  is n ow d ivor ced  from h um an  ri gh ts  con sid er at ion s).
44. S ee The res a A. Ama to, Not e, Labor Rights Conditionali ty: United States
Trade Legi sla tion  a n d  t h e In ter na tion al T rad e Ord er,  65 N.Y.U. L. RE V. 79, 83-84
(1990) (discussing th e use of United Sta tes economic relations to require a va riet y of
lab or  la w ch an ges ).
45. S ee Douglas Jak e Caldwell, Commen t , International Environmental
Agreements and th e GATT: An An alysis of the Potential Conflict and t he Role of a
G AT T  “Wa iver ” Res olu tion , 18 MD . J . IN T’L L. &  TRAD E  173, 193 (1994); Chan a R.
Schoenbe rge r , S hr im p Di spu te T est s U .S . Us e of T rad e to P rot ect E nv iron m ent , WALL
ST . J ., J ul y 15 , 19 97,  at  A14.
46. S ee, e.g., Pa t M. H olt, Religiou s Pers ecut ion  in  th e Glob al B ala nce ,
CHR ISTI AN  SCI . MONITOR , Oct . 2, 19 97, a t 1 9; In  th e R eal W orld , Pr in ciples Are Costly ,
BU F F . N EWS , J uly 6, 19 97, at  H3; Ma ry Le ona rd, Fai th , H ope, B ut  Fir st , Pol icy ,
BOSTON  GLOBE , Oct . 26, 1997 , at  E1 ; U.S . Hi ts C hi na , R us sia  on P ersecu tion  of
Chri st ians, CH I . TRI ., J uly 22, 1 997, a t 6.
however, t h is  broa d  br ush a ppr oach is never im plemen ted
unless th ere ar e additiona l reasons wh y limit ing economic
re lat ions is  conside re d a  good policy.
Economic leverage has also been used in t he a rea  of labor
rights. For  exam ple, t he U nit ed St at es h as  pr edicat ed cer ta in
kinds of econ omic r ela t ion s on  t he  k inds  of l abor  r igh t s  tha t  a
coun t ry a ffords  to its citizens.44 Addit iona lly, economic lever age
has been us ed to encoura ge certa in  kinds  of envi ronmenta l
p rotect ion . For exam ple, the U nited  Sta tes h as pla ced
emba rgoes on cer ta in  kinds  of goods from certain kinds of
coun t r ie s either  because t hose goods wer e pr oduced in  an
envir onm ent ally unsa fe way or  because  the p roces s of
producing or developin g th ose goods was  envir onm ent ally
dest ru ctive.45
F i n ally, in th e last  couple of year s, we ha ve began t o see
some movement  towar d monit oring in th e religious liber t ies
ar ea  as  well. Those  who h ave followed develop m e n ts in
Wash ing ton , D.C ., h ave s een  su bs tan t ia l d iscuss ion  of
leg is la t ion  tha t  wou ld p red ica t e  t rade r e la t ions  wi th a  coun t ry
on i t s non-d iscr imina tory  t rea tme n t  of religious minorities.46
This  issu e ha s st ron g politica l ap pea l in t he  U.S. a nd  is lik ely t o
become very poten t over t he coming year s. Bot h  t h e pol it ica l
left , repr esent ed by ma ny of th e hu ma n r igh t s  act ivi st s , and  the
pol it ica l r igh t , pa r t icu la r ly t he con se r va t ive  r eli giou s
movements,  may we ll end u p s upp or t in g t h is  kin d of a pp roach .
You add  to tha t  those  wh o gen er a lly  se em  to favor
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47. S ee Flock in g to C hu rch , ARIZ. DAILY STAR , J an . 4,  199 8, a t 1 E [h ereinafter
Flocking to Ch ur ch ]; see also Mad elein e Albrigh t, R eligi ous  Freedom: A  Foreig n P olicy
Priority, VITAL  SP E E C H E S  O F  TH E  DAY, Nov. 15, 1997, at 72-75.
48. S ee J ulia  Spoor, Com men t, Go Tell it  on th e Moun tain , Bu t Keep it  Ou t of
the Off ice: Rel igio us  Ha ras sm ent  in  th e Wor kp lace , 31 VAL . U. L. RE V. 971, 978 n.35
(citing Kar lyn Bowm an  et a l., Faith In Am erica, P U B . P E R S P ., Sept. 1994, at 90
(199 4)); see als o Rep orts : Am erica n F ait h S tead y, Poi sed  for Grow th , SU N -SE N T I N E L
(F t. Laude rdale), Ju n. 14, 1997, at 6D.
49. S ee Flock in g to C hu rch , supra  note 47.
protect ion i sm, such a s th e labor un ions, and you h ave a
poten tia lly power ful politica l coa lit ion . Th is  is su e a lso has a
mora l ly appea ling d im en sion , wh ich  makes  it  eve n  more
irresistible. Mor eove r , t ha t  mora l a pp ea l der ives fr om among
t h e feelings t ha t Amer icans h old most dear , religion. After  a l l,
the Un it ed S tat e s is a  deep ly re ligious coun tr y.47 Ove r  95% of
Amer icans pr ofess a be lief in a d ivine  bein g,48 and  over  80% say
th ey go to chur ch on a regular basis.49 Amer ica  is t hu s st ill
fundamenta l ly a d eeply r eligious  count ry a nd  th er e is lik ely t o
be little ar ound wh ich agreem ent  can  coalesce mor e effectively
than  persecu t ion  of religiou s m in or it ies . Re ligiou s p er se cut ion
is a ls o a  powerful issue in the United Stat es Congress because
who, a ft er  a ll,  can  be  se en  as op pos in g r eli giou s l ibe r t ies  or
favorin g the repression of religious minorities. Thus, as a
pr edict ive ma tt er, concer n over  religious  libert ies will lik ely
increase in the Un ited States.
V. CO N C L U S I O N
 In  conclusion ,  it  i s impor tan t  to reca l l the  role the U n it ed
Stat es Con gr es s p la ys  in  pr es su r in g t he P res iden t . E conom ic
and oth er  sa nct ions a re , of cour se, a dm in i ste red  by  the
Presiden t , wh o is  gen er a lly  give n  conside rable  discr et ion .
Nevertheless, as t ime goes on  an d t he P res iden t r ar ely
exercises tha t  d iscre t ion  in  a  p rominen t  and visib le wa y th at
sat isfies the supporters of the pa r t icular right being advanced,
t ha t  discretion is gradually reduced. That  patt ern can be seen
most clearly in th e ar eas of tra de an d environm ent , where t he
Presiden t ’s discr et ion t o refr ain  from a ctin g h a s been
dramat ica l ly reduced, almost t o th e point  of non-existe nce. Well
aware of that  patt ern, moreover, many Presidents a ct t o avoid
fur the r re st rict ions on  th eir  discr et ion. Th us , desp ite  the
prot es ta t ions tha t  mos t  Admin ist ra t ions  make tha t  un ila tera l
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or  bilat e r a l s a nct ions  a re not  a  good  th ing  and a lways
compromise int er na tion al r ela tion s, n ever th eless , th e Presiden t
oft e n follows t he  will of Congre ss m uch  mor e t ha n on e m ight
exp ect , given the Administrat ion’s rhetoric, and thr eatens or
act ua lly imp oses s an ctions  wit h s ur pr isin g frequ en cy.
The pr oble ms w it h  thes e u n ila ter a l or  bil a ter a l sanct ion s
a re qu ite  considera ble. First , the s election of count ries t ends
not  to be ba sed s olely on th e factor s t ha t a re id ent ified in t he
leg is la t ion . Tha t  is , human  r igh ts  or  labor concern s, however
paramount  in t he la ngu age of th e legislation, often become less
impor tan t  in  the actua l  impos it ion  of sanct ions  than  other
foreign  policy concer ns . Second , th is bila te ra l mon itor ing a nd
bilater al  or un ilat era l sa nct ions a re n ot a pplied  in a n  even-
ha nded  manner.  C ou n t r ies with  whom we h ave other  problems
tend to be the quickest targets, for example. We also tend to
pick on sm alle r , le ss  econ omica lly  im por tan t  or politica lly
power fu l count ries  whe n we  imp ose sa nct ions. Th ird ,  u n like
NGOs, th ere is less evidence th at  th e U.S. focuses m ost
int ens ely on  the  mos t  impor tan t  i ssues  fi r st .  In  the
environm ent al  and h uman r igh t s  a reas , for  example , th i s has
cer ta in ly been t ru e. We have often urged actions in area s that
can  only be described as  ma rgina l to real en vironmen ta l
pr otection  or  rea l enhancement  of human r ights . Four th ,  unl ike
t h e NGOs,  we  do n ot  t en d t o exa min e ou r  own  behavior  very
closely when we en gage in bilatera l monitoring. In fact, we t end
to avoid any examina t ion  of human  r igh t s  viola t ions in  a reas  in
which  we ha ve some problems in t he U .S. Fin ally, t h is  sor t  of
an  approach  is  often count er-productive in t ha t it n ot only does
not  focus  on  the  main  issues or ma in countr ies, but it  very
likely upset s virtu ally everybody in t he pr ocess.
Wha t  is the answer? This behavior by the United Stat es is ,
after  all, a rea lity and  not likely to disapp ear  soon . Therefore,
the qu es t ion , I t h in k, is  wh et her  those  wit h  concer ns a bou t
reli giou s liberty and geopoliti cal st abilit y can w ork q uickly
en ough  to de velop a  conse nsu s on  a t  lea st  som e m in im al set  of
norms, as  well a s on m onit orin g devices, to am eliora te t he
p res su re in the  Un i ted S ta t es for  t h i s k ind  of b il a tera l
moni tor ing. Such a  subst an tive consen sus  will be difficu l t t o
achieve, b u t  confer en ces  lik e t h is  one ar e cert ain ly a st ep in  the
righ t  dir ection. A consen su s on in st itu tion s will a lso be difficult,
bu t one m igh t  we ll a n t icip a te t ha t  su ch  a  consensus , a t  lea st  on
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ Y O U -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
501] EXTERNAL MONITORING 515
ins tit u t ions , wou ld  in volve  som e r a n ge of r egi on a l
organizations, i nt e rna tional organ izations, an d perh aps  even
NGOs. Though u ndoubt edly difficult to achieve, tha t  consensus
is cer ta inly w ha t ou r goa l sh ould b e. 
